An internal web application stores user passwords in cleartext. What is the MOST appropriate action to mitigate this risk?

An internal web application stores user passwords in cleartext. What is the MOST appropriate action to mitigate this risk?

• A. Encrypt the passwords with symmetric encryption and a master key.
• B. Hash the passwords using a secure hashing algorithm with salting.
• C. Hash the passwords without any salt.
• D. Keep passwords in cleartext but move the database behind a stronger firewall.

Answer: (B)

When passwords are stored securely, they should be transformed into something non-reversible that protects them even if the database is accessed by an attacker. Using a unique salt per password and hashing with a modern, slow algorithm (like bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2) achieves this. The salt ensures that identical passwords become different hashes and prevents precomputed rainbow-table attacks, while the slow hashing makes brute-forcing impractical. Storing with symmetric encryption and a master key is not ideal because it’s reversible—if the key is compromised, all passwords can be recovered. Hashing without a salt allows attackers to use precomputed tables and see identical hashes for the same passwords. Keeping passwords in cleartext behind a firewall offers no real protection if the database is breached. Therefore, the best mitigation is to store salted hashes using a strong, adaptive hashing method.

When passwords are stored securely, they should be transformed into something non-reversible that protects them even if the database is accessed by an attacker. Using a unique salt per password and hashing with a modern, slow algorithm (like bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2) achieves this. The salt ensures that identical passwords become different hashes and prevents precomputed rainbow-table attacks, while the slow hashing makes brute-forcing impractical.

Storing with symmetric encryption and a master key is not ideal because it’s reversible—if the key is compromised, all passwords can be recovered. Hashing without a salt allows attackers to use precomputed tables and see identical hashes for the same passwords. Keeping passwords in cleartext behind a firewall offers no real protection if the database is breached. Therefore, the best mitigation is to store salted hashes using a strong, adaptive hashing method.